Where a man was indicted by federal and state grand juries for drug crimes, but he alleged that law enforcement withheld exculpatory evidence that was material to the finding of probable cause, the officers’ omissions misled prosecutors such that the man’s subsequent indictment cannot protect them from liability.
Background
While executing a search warrant at the home of Lee Marvin Harris Sr., law enforcement officers found a trafficking amount of cocaine in an old, inoperable Cadillac that was parked in the yard. Harris Sr. spent approximately five months in pretrial detention before federal prosecutors dismissed all charges against him, and he was released.
Harris Sr. filed suit against the town of Southern Pines and the officers involved in his arrest. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
Malicious prosecution
To state such a claim, Harris Sr. must show that (1) appellees seized him “pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause,” and (2) “that the criminal proceedings have terminated in [his] favor.” Only the first element is in dispute.
The officers argue that handing cash to a known drug distributor in front of the trap house indicates drug-related activity. Harris Sr. argues that there is evidence that the officers also knew that (1) his mother-in-law lived in the house next door to the trap house, (2) McRae owned a mobile car washing business and (3) when Harris Sr.’s car reappeared in the footage after disappearing out of view for some time, it was notably cleaner. The additional facts Harris Sr. cites are supported by the record, and he is correct that they create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers could have reasonably believed that this interaction supported a finding of probable cause.
The District Court stated that “the finding of illegal contraband on Plaintiff’s property alone provides probable cause for his warrantless arrest.” It likened this case to several of this court’s precedents. But those precedents are distinguishable because their facts provide a significantly stronger basis for the inference that the contraband belonged to the defendant.
Next, an indictment, “‘fair upon its face,’ returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury,’” is often conclusive evidence that the officers had probable cause to arrest. And Harris Sr. was indicted by both state and federal grand juries following his arrest. But Harris Sr. contends that the officers did not disclose that Harris Jr. was a known drug trafficker, that officers had observed Harris Jr. at the Cadillac while conducting surveillance of the house, that the packaging of the cocaine found in the Cadillac was identical to the packaging of cocaine found at the home of Harris Jr.’s supplier, that the vehicle was inoperable, that it had no battery and that the registration was expired.
Because the exculpatory evidence that officers withheld was material to the finding of probable cause, the officers’ omissions misled prosecutors such that Harris Sr.’s subsequent indictment cannot protect them from liability. Accordingly, the District Court erred in concluding that there was probable cause to arrest Harris Sr.
Qualified immunity
The District Court held that the officers were entitled to summary judgment because “finding probable cause to arrest upon discovery of illegal contraband in a home or a vehicle, a reasonable law enforcement officer would not have understood that arresting Plaintiff upon finding narcotics on his property violated a clearly established constitutional right.” But, as explained above, those cases are not remotely applicable. And it defies common sense to say that an officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is deliberately withholding exculpatory evidence from prosecutors until after a suspect is indicted.
Due process
The District Court held that “Plaintiff’s due process fabrication of evidence claim fails because the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed and the alleged loss of liberty was pretrial detention.” The District Court cited two Supreme Court cases for the proposition that unlawful pretrial detention claims properly arise solely under the Fourth Amendment. These cases are inapposite, and no other circuits has held that either of these cases precludes a fabrication of evidence claim where the defendant was detained pretrial but not convicted.
Remaining claims
The court affirms the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the state law malicious prosecution claim, failure to intervene claim and Monell claim on the basis that Harris Sr. has waived any argument that the District Court erred with respect to these claims.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
Dissenting opinion
Rushing, J., dissenting:
I would affirm in full the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the defendants. The defendant police officers had probable cause to arrest Harris Sr. for drug crimes. And probable cause defeats Harris’s malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence claims, which are both based in the Fourth Amendment.
Harris v. Town of Southern Pines, case no. 23-1791, Aug. 5, 2024. 4th Cir. (Gregory), from MDNC at Greensboro (Osteen). Abraham Rubert-Schewel for Appellant. Christian Ferlan for Appellees. 39 pp.