U.S. Supreme Court upholds ‘ghost gun’ regulation

The federal Gun Control Act’s definition of “firearm” is broad enough to authorize the regulation of weapon parts kits “designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile” and “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional” frames or receivers, a divided U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in reversing a 5th Circuit decision invalidating a 2022 rule issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives. Click here to read the full text of Bondi v.Vanderstock.

BULLET POINTS:

“[18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A)] authorizes ATF to regulate ‘any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.’ Inhering in this language are two requirements. First, a ‘weapon’ must be present. Second, that ‘weapon’ must meet one of three criteria: It must be able to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive, designed to do so, or susceptible of ready conversion to operate that way. As the Fifth Circuit saw it, [27 CFR] §478.11’s provisions addressing weapon parts kits are facially invalid because no weapon parts kit can ever satisfy the statute’s two requirements. We disagree because, to our eyes, at least some kits will satisfy both.”

— Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, majority opinion

“The Government asked this Court just last Term to ‘rewrite’ statutory text so that it could regulate semiautomatic weapons as machineguns. Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406, 428 (2024). We declined to do so. The Government now asks us to rewrite statutory text so that it can regulate weapon-parts kits. This time, the Court obliges. I would not. The statutory terms ‘frame’ and “receiver” do not cover the unfinished frames and receivers contained in weapon-parts kits, and weapon-parts kits themselves do not meet the statutory definition of ‘firearm.’ That should end the case. The majority instead blesses the Government’s overreach based on a series of errors regarding both the standard of review and the interpretation of the statute.”

— Justice Clarence Thomas, dissenting